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Note
Multiple Employer Trusts, Preemption, and ERISA: A
Case for Federal Regulation and a Proposal for
Statutory Reform
I.

INTRODUCTION

The growth of multiple employer trusts (METs) has been
an area of concern since the 1974 enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).' A MET, which
2
markets group health and life insurance to small employers,
differs from the typical employer-operated ERISA plan in that
a MET is a profit-making enterprise that usually controls and
administers the plan.3 By providing group welfare benefits and
assuming responsibility for ERISA compliance, the MET offers
the advantages of group health and life insurance to businesses
that could not otherwise afford such coverage for their employ1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. II 1979)) [hereinafter ERISA]. See also Regulations Relating to Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509-2560, 26012615 (1979).
2. METs are entrepreneurial entities that offer group packages of welfare
benefits to small businesses for the benefit of the businesses' employers. See
Hutchinson & Ifshin, FederalPreemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L REv. 23, 44-51 (1978); Turza &
Halloway, Preemption of State Laws Under ERISA-Part II, 5 J. PENSION PLAN.
& COMPLIANCE 441, 447-49 (1979). See generallyBrummond, The Legal Status of
Uninsured Noncollectively-BargainedMultiple-Employer Welfare Trusts Under
ERISA and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRAcusE L. REv. 701 (1977).
3. Although some commentators refer to METs in a broader sense, see
Brummond, supra note 2, at 701-02, normally a MET is defined as a noncollectively bargained welfare trust. See id. at 701. These noncollectively bargained
METs may be either self-insured or insured by other companies. See Brummond, supra note 2, at 701; David, Employee benefit trusts' growth alarms officials; more failuresfeared, Bus. Ins., Feb. 21, 1977, at 1. Cf. Comment, ERISA
Preemption and Indirect Regulation of Employee Welfare Plans Through State
Insurance Laws, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1536 (1978).
METs are to be distinguished from ERISA multiemployer plans, defined in
29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (1976), which involve only pension benefits. See 1 PENS.
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 2472 (Oct. 19, 1978). The Multiemployer Pension Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, recently tightened regulation of
these multiemployer plans. See 5 PENS. PLAN GUmIE (CCH) 1 22,862 (Oct. 3,
1980).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:459

ees.4 Although ERISA is responsible for the growth of multiple
employer trusts,5 it is unclear whether METs are subject to regulation by'the federal government through ERISA or by the
6
states through their varying insurance laws.
Perceiving regulation under ERISA to be less stringent
than state regulation, proponents of METs have sought to
avoid state control by structuring themselves to fall under the
federal act and its broad preemption section. 8 Some states
have chosen not to regulate METs,9 while others have been
4. Without METs, small employers have great difficulty in finding an independent insurer. See David, Congressional report backs state trust regulation, Bus. Ins., May 2, 1977, at 14 ("'[generally speaking, insurance companies
have turned their backs on the small employers' ") (quoting David Manley, Ad-

ministrator of the Ohio Employers Trust, which at that time covered 31,000 employ6rs and dependents). An IRS official reports that small employer plans
account for "'98 percent of all the terminations that have been reported to us
since ERISA."' Lurie, Lanoff & Stuchinor, Current Developments and a Preview of Things to Come, 35 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 169, 174 (1977) (remarks of

Alvin D. Lurie, the then Assistant Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations). Thus, it appears that
small employer plans to provide group benefits to employees often suffer
financial setbacks. Insurance companies claim that small employers are underrepresented in insured plans because it is, financially risky to insure them.
David, supra, at 14.
5. METs are primarily important to small employers who cannot secure
the favorable economies of scale, enjoyed by large employers, when developing
ERISA plans. See, e.g., David, supra note 4, at 14 (METs are "serving small employers who have been abandoned by insurance companies"); David, State
takes over insurerafter severe trust losses, Bus. Ins., July 11, 1977, at 1 (trust's
primary target is groups of three to one hundred persons) [hereinafter cited as
Trust Losses].
The use of METs in the small business sector appears to be increasing, but
precise figures are unavailable. A series of articles in Business Insurance in
1977 reported substantial growth of METs. At least one underwriter, Old Republic Life Insurance Company of Illinois, expanded its multiemployer trust
business 1500 percent after ERISA-from four million dollars in 1974 to over 60
million dollars in 1975. David, supra note 3, at 1, 32. One consultant in the MET
field, George T. deHeuck, has estimated the market for insured and self-insured
trusts at $2 billion a year. David, supra note 4, at 14. The number of individuals
covered is estimated to range from 1.7 to 3 million employees. David, Move
against trusts, states urged, Bus. Ins., June 27, 1977, at 2.
6. See text accompanying notes 30-55 infra.
7. See, e.g., David, Labor Limits trusts' use of commissions, Bus. Ins., Nov.
14, 1977, at 1, 58 (METs "apparently believe that regulation will be lighter under
ERISA than under state insurance law").
8. See notes 16, 32-36 infra and accompanying text.
9. Effective regulation of METs apparently has occurred in only a few
states. See David, California challengesfour self-funded trusts, Bus. Ins., Sept.
19, 1977, at 6. (regulatory efforts observed in California, Florida and Georgia).
See generally Geisel, More labor dept. edicts threaten self-funded METs, Bus.
Ins., Aug. 6, 1979, at 1 (aggressive enforcement efforts continue in California).
For a discussion of the effectiveness of these state enforcement efforts, see
notes 145-54 infra and accompanying text.
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prevented from regulating them by federal courts.10 When successful in avoiding state jurisdiction, METs have operated in a
regulatory vacuum." Several METs have gone bankrupt, leading to the loss of millions of dollars in employee benefits, the
termination of small ERISA plans, and the creation of conflicting precedent. 12 Following legislative oversight hearings on
ERISA,13 the United States Department of Labor14 recently attempted to give the states regulatory control of METs by declaring that most METs are not subject to federal supervision
under ERISA.15 In response to the Labor Department's decree,
METs have restructured themselves and are seeking another
round of court interpretation, claiming once again their status
as ERISA-covered employee benefit plans.16 Thus, the adapta10. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(Hawaiian Prepaid Health Care Act preempted by ERISA) and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (California's Knox-Keene
prepaid health insurance law preempted by ERISA), affd per curiam,571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 381 (1978) with Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562
F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977) (New Hampshire's mandatory coverage for mental disorders not preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978) and Insurer's
Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976) (Minnesota
Comprehensive Health Insurance Act not preempted by ERISA). Also, compare Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977) (MET not an employee benefit plan under ERISA and thus subject to
state law) and Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan.
1977) (MET not an employee benefit plan under ERISA) and Hamberlin v. VIP
Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977) (MET not an employee benefit plan)
with LB.T. v. Security Health Plan, Bus. Ins., Feb. 19, 1979, at 2 (D. Cal. Jan.
1979) (consent judgment without written opinion) (MET an employee benefit
plan).
11. The phrase "regulatory vacuum" has frequently been used to describe
the status of METs and welfare plans under ERISA. See, e.g., David, Labor assists 2 states in action against trust, Bus. Ins., June 13, 1977, at 40; Brummond,
Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IowA L.
REV.57, 118 (1976).
12. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text.
13. HOUSE Comm. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,AcTrvrrY REPORT, H.R. REP.
No. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1977) (hereinafter cited as AcTIVrT REPORTI.
14. The Department of Labor and the Department of Treasury have coordinating regulatory roles under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1204 (1976). The Department of Labor, however, assumes responsibility for the major substantive
provisions of ERISA, see id. at §§ 1021-1028, while the Treasury Department is
responsible for the tax-related provisions of ERISA, see I.RC. §§ 6057-6059, as
well for the coordination of joint efforts with the Department of Labor. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1976).
15. See Department of Labor News Release No. 553, 5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 22,194 (Aug. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as News Release].
16. See, e.g., Brummond, supra note 2, at 701 ("a number of states have experienced problems with [MET] organizations which claim to be exempt from
state insurance laws because of the preemption provision of that Act [ERISA]"); David, supra note 11, at 40 ("trusts usually provide medical and health
benefits, file with the federal government as employee benefit plans under ERISA and argue they are exempt from state regulation"); Geisel, Benefit trust
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bility of METs may continue to cause serious problems.
This Note will discuss the MET-ERISA problem and will
explore possible judicial and administrative responses. It will
then analyze ERISA's objectives and will apply them to the
MET problem, demonstrating that federal regulation is both appropriate and necessary. Finally, three statutory reforms, to
control METs and to impose order on a confused area of ERISA law, will be pro-posed. The proposed reforms include
broadening ERISA's fiduciary and preemption sections, establishing minimum welfare benefits criteria applicable to METs,
and changing the Act's reporting and disclosure requirements
7
to ensure compliance with the first two reforms.'
11.

ERISA AND METs: THE PROBLEM

ERISA is an ambitious statute intended to strengthen the
pension18 and welfare19 rights of employees in the private secsues to regain its status as valid ERISA plan, Bus. Ins., Aug. 22, 1979, at 3. See
also notes 32-36, 41-55 infra and accompanying text.
17. The position of this Note, that METs should be regulated through the
auspices of ERISA, is contrary to the views of David J. Brummond, counsel to
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. See generally Amicus
Curiae Brief, Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692
(7th Cir. 1977); Brummond, supra note 10; Brummond, supra note 2. For a direct response to Brummond's analysis, see note 147 infra.
18. A "pension plan" is defined in ERISA as a plan that
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or (B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of
covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating
the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976).
19. Welfare plans are defined in ERISA as those programs
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day
care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any
benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on
retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976). Section 186(c), part of the Labor Management Relations Act, details similar welfare fringe benefits for union employees, including
compensation for occupationally related illness or injury. 29 U.S.C. 186(c) (1976
& Supp. I1 1979). In 1970 there were approximately 150,000 welfare plans covering hospitalization and about 138,000 plans covering surgery. Turza & Halloway,
Preemption of State Laws Under ERISA-Part 1,5 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLUANCE 361, 363 n.6 (1979) (citing N. LEViN, ERISA AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT
BENEFIT FUNDS 18-19 (2d ed. 1975)).
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tor. 20 In part the Act, was a response to the problems of corruption and insolvency that plagued certain pension and
welfare funds. 21 ERISA's purpose was essentially twofold: to
protect employees against the abuses related to employee benefit plans and to improve the equitable nature and financial
soundness of these plans.22 Pension and welfare plans must
comply with the reporting and disclosure requirements of the
Act 23 and must meet the fiduciary standard of section 1104.24 In
addition, both welfare and pension plans are subject to the civil
enforcement 25 and preemption 2 6 provisions. In contrast to the
detailed treatment given pension plans, however, welfare plans
are treated perfunctorily by parts of the Act,27 and are rarely
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
21. One of the largest examples of mass pension fund termination occurred when the Studebaker plant closed in 1964 and more than 4,000 participants between ages 40 and 60 lost $14 million (85 percent of the current value)
of their vested benefits. See Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest for Parity, 28 VAND. L REV. 641, 668-69, n.196 (1975);
Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, at 364 n.17.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. DI 1979); HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFrr SECURITY ACT OF 1973, H.P. REP. No. 533,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4639,
4647 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 533]. See also Brummond, supra note
11, at 61-62; Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, at 363.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31, 1101-14 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
24. Id. at § 1104(a) (1). ERISA's fiduciary section provides that
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent
with the provisions of this subchapter.
Id. See notes 126-53 infra and accompanying text.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976). ERISA's broad civil enforcement capability
complements its broad definitions of fiduciary and fiduciary responsibilities.
By contrast, prior law had only one major enforcement weapon, and that
weapon was often counterproductive to protection of employee benefits. See
Little & ThrailldUl, FiduciariesUnderERISA: A NarrowPath to Tread, 30 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1977).
26. ERISA's preemption section declares the federal regulatory scheme
exclusive and prohibits states from concurrent or conflicting enforcement efforts. See notes 62-110 infra and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Brummond, supra note 11, at 116 (inclusion of welfare plans
in preemption section given "almost no attention" by Congress). See also Little & Thrailkill, supra note 25, at 12 (fiduciary prudent man standard of 29
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mentioned in the lengthy compilation of ERISA's legislative
history. 28 Consequently, pension plan regulation under ERISA
has developed much differently, and with more statutory gui29
dance, than welfare plan regulations.
Prior to ERISA, METs would have clearly been subject to
state laws through the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which delegated primary responsibility for regulation of insurance to the
states. 30 Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, some states have
mandated minimum benefit packages for METs, but these
packages vary significantly from state to state. 3] To meet the
U.S.C. § 1104 (1976), and its applicability to welfare plans unexplained in 1974
congressional reports).
28. The legislative history of ERISA was recorded in Suncomm. ON LABOR
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF

1974, (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For a
history of the events leading to the adoption of ERISA, see Chadwick & Foster,
supra note 21, at 669.
29. Importantly, pension plans have minimum vesting standards under
ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976), whereas welfare plans have no analogous
minimum benefit requirements, see 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1976). The difference is
dramatic: while employers must carefully provide minimum pension benefits
under ERISA, welfare benefits may be completely illusory. At least one court,
however, has interpreted ERISA's broad remedial scope to imply minimum
welfare benefit standards. See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv.
Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977), affd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th

Cir. 1977).
A further difference between ERISA's treatment of pension and welfare
plans is that a modified "entire portfolio" standard has been postulated for pension plan fiduciaries, but no such doctrine exists on the welfare side. 29 C.F.
22,111 (June 26, 1979). See
§ 2550.404a-1 (1979); 5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH),
Bank of New York v. Spitzkev, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164
(1974). See generally Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLum. L. REV. 721, 766-67 (1976);
Gerard & Schreiber, Securities Investments Under ERISA, 35 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAx. 65, 104 (1977); Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule
Under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L,
REV. 960, 968 (1975).
30. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Pub. L No. 79-15, § 1, 59 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976)). Section One of the Act provides in part:
[t] hat the Congress hereby declares that the continued rgulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
business by the several States.
See also Brummond, supra note 11, at 80.
31. For example, Connecticut and New Hampshire require each issuer of a
group health insurance policy to provide coverage for the treatment of mental
illnesses and emotional disorders. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174(d) (West
1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-a(I) (Supp. 1979). The neighboring New
England states do not require such coverage. As a result, one union fund, with
members in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine, was forced to drop fringe
benefit dental and vision coverage for all of its members to provide the
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varying minimum benefit requirements of several states, METs
must provide broad coverage to all covered employees, thereby
increasing the costs of both health coverage and administration.32 Because varying state requirements are a clear financial
burden to any multistate entity providing benefits to employee
groups in different states, there is a strong incentive for METs
to avoid such regulation by registering33 as employee benefit
plans under ERISA.34 Such "ERISA trusts" are not subject to
federal mandatory benefits schedules because, unlike pension
plan vesting requirements,3 5 ERISA does not specify minimum
benefit requirements for welfare plans.3 6 METs are therefore
free to design the most profitable benefit packages-a freedom
that has led to inadequate insurance coverage 37 and an exacerbation of the adverse selection phenomenon of private insurance. 38 Several self-insured, multiple employer trusts have
mandatory mental health coverage for its New Hampshire subscribers. See
David, State regulation of benefits under attack, Bus. Ins., Aug. 8, 1977, at 2.
Some states require disability pay for pregnant women. See, e.g., N.Y.
WoRy. Comp. LAw § 201(9) (B) (McKinney Supp. 1980); IRL GEN. LAWS § 28-41-8
(Supp. 1980). A comprehensive schedule for minimum benefits is provided in a
few states. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 1340-1399.64 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1980); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 393 (1979). This variation in state benefit requirements should be distinguished from the total lack of MET regulation
found in some states. See notes 9 & 11 supra and accompanying text.
32. The multistate burden for an employer can be substantial. The Civil
Service Commission estimated that compliance with each state's minimum regulations cost the federal government an additional 125 million dollars. David,
supra note 31, at 1. The Council on Employee Benefits, representing 160 companies with six million covered employees, claimed that varying regulations
cost its members over 200 million dollars a year. Id. at 2.
33. To register under ERISA, a MET must file a plan description, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(a) (1) (B) (1976), and a copy of the summary plan description, which is
sent to participants and beneficiaries, with the Secretary of Labor. Id. at
§ 1024(a) (1) (C). For the statutorily required contents of both the plan description and the summary plan description, see id. at § 1022.
34. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976); note 29 supra.
36. See note 29 supra. See also Electrical Workers v. LB.E.W., 583 S.W.2d
154, 159 (en banc) (Mo. 1979) (holding Missouri law not preempted since ERISA contains no substantive welfare plan requirements); Brummond, supra
note 2, at 703 ("[b]ecause ERISA was drafted primarily with a view toward
preventing pension plan abuses, its regulation of welfare benefit plans leaves
much to be desired").
37. See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692
(7th Cir. 1977) (no conversion privileges in MET plan); note 40 infra.
38. Adverse selection is the term used to describe the overinclusion of
poor risk insureds in group insurance plans-a phenomenon that private insurance companies attempt to avoid. See L DENENBERG, RISK INSURANCE 156-65
(2d ed. 1974); R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 8 (1971); E. PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw 229 (2d ed. 1957). In order to avoid an "undue degree of adverse selection," IL KEETON, supra at 63, unregulated group
insurers will seek protection through any of several devices. The insurer may
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now gone bankrupt, jeopardizing millions of dollars in employee welfare benefits. 3 9 Employees faced with catastrophic
illness or injury have been left without coverage. 40
To avoid such problems, several states have argued that
METs are not ERISA plans and are subject to regulation under
state laws. 41 Some METs have responded by changing their
structures to avoid state control. 42 For example, although most
METs were once underwritten by insured carriers, events per43
suaded many METs to begin absorbing their risks internally.
In 1976, the Illinois Department of Insurance ordered the Old
Republic Life Insurance Company of Chicago to shut down its
trust business within sixty days 4 4 because it was "near bankruptcy."45 The action left many multiple employer trusts without an underwriter. 46 Thus, the METs either had to find a new
underwriter or file as ERISA self-insured trusts with the federal government.4 7 Self-insurance became the more attractive
require that "a high percentage of the persons within a group (e.g., all the employees of one employer) be participating in the insurance plan," thereby ensuring a financially sound average level of risk. Id. The insurers may also
refuse to insure certain high risk groups or groups not susceptible to predictable loss measurement. H. DENENBERG, supra at 159. Each of these techniques
excludes poor risk individuals before injury or disability occurs. But an unregulated insurer may find it more profitable to exclude such individuals after injury occurs (e.g., through inadequate benefit schedules or low coverage
ceilings), and thereby collect a maximum premium with minimal risk of
financial loss. In the present regulatory vacuum, some METs have created and
exploited similar illusory benefit schemes. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
39. A California MET, National Multiple Employers Foundation (NMEF),
filed for bankruptcy on February 2, 1977. David, supra note 3, at 1. Another
California group, Hospital Welfare Association Trust (HWA), collapsed in April
1977. David, Self-funded trust collapses; deficit could be $4 million, Bus. Ins.,
Apr. 4, 1977, at 1. A Massachusetts firm, Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co. of
Boston, was taken over by its state insurance department after suffering considerable losses. Trust Losses, supra note 5, at 1. In early 1979, a Michigan
MET, Associated Health Plans Inc., was placed in receivership of that state's
insurance department. McKee, First self-funded MET wins federal status, Bus.
Ins., Feb. 19, 1979, at 89.
40. The facts of Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567
F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977), in which a welfare policy underwriter went bankrupt,
are illustrative even though the plaintiff eventually recovered benefits.
41. These states include California, Florida, and Georgia. See note 9 supra.
42. See note 16 supra. See also David, Trusts retrench in wake of court decisions, Bus. Ins., Oct. 17, 1977, at 1, 48.
43. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1544-45; Brummond, supra note 11, at
79.
44. Trust Losses, supra note 5, at 32.
45. Id. Illinois authorities hoped to prevent large in-state losses by restricting losses from the firm's primarily out-of-state trust business. Id. at 31.
46. Id. at 31.
47. See id. at 1, 31; David, supra note 11, at 1, 49. Many METs sought Na-
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choice after a second important development: a decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Wadsworth v. Whaland,48 which subjected insured trusts to varying state control but left self-insured trusts under uniform,
lenient federal control.49 The court stated that ERISA only preempted states from directly regulating self-insured plans, but
not from indirectly regulating insured plans by regulating their
insurers.5 0 The Wadsworth court then found that a New Hampshire insurance statute was not preempted by ERISA51 because the state law only indirectly affected the federal
regulatory scheme. 52 Consequently, many METs opted for self53
funded status to avoid state regulation altogether.
The marketing structure of MET plans also became a significant factor in several preemption decisions. Because METs
originally sold employee benefit plans both to employers and
directly to employees, several courts held they were not "employee benefit plans" within the meaning of ERISA.54 METs
subsequently abandoned direct marketing to employees and
55
limited sales efforts to employers.
tional Multiple Employers Foundation as a new underwriter, but it went bankrupt also. See note 39 supra.
48. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978). For a more
detailed discussion of the factual background of this case, see notes 84-92 infra
and accompanying text.
49. 562 F.2d at 77-78.
50. Id.
51. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying.text.
52. 562 F.2d at 76-79. For a criticism of the First Circuit's approach, see
Comment, supra note 3, at 1538-49. See also Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2,
at 67, 76; Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, at 450-52.
53. The Wadsworth court noted that the plans before it were insured
plans-not self-insured plans. The court stated that if the New Hampshire statute had tried to regulate the employee welfare plans as insurers, such direct
regulation would clearly be preempted by ERISA. 562 F.2d at 76 (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (1976) ("[a]n employee benefit plan ... shall [not] be
deemed to be an insurance company ... for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies")).
54. See, e.g., Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 390-91
(D. Kan. 1977) (entrepreneurial agency that sold employee benefit plans to employers or self-employed workers not an "employee benefit plan" within the
meaning of ERISA § 1002 and consequently was subject to state law); Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196, 1198-99 (D. Ariz. 1977) (employee benefit
trust marketing benefits both through employers and directly to employees was
entrepreneurial, solely in the interest of the insurance brokers, and not within
the ambit of ERISA). See also David, supra note 11, at 40-41 (majority of Labor
Department task force members studying self-funded trusts favor ruling that
such trusts "are not employee benefit plans under ERISA").
55. See David, supra note 11, at 40-41; David, supra note 42, at 1, 48.
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JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES

These attempts to avoid state regulation have prompted a
series of judicial and administrative actions.
A.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

The judicial efforts to control METs have focused on ERISA's preemption section and have resulted in narrowing the
broad preemption language of the act. Congress was originally
concerned with state regulatory efforts that might conflict with
ERISA, and therefore enacted very broad preemption standards. 56 Section 1144 provides that "this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 57 That section's
"deemer" provision further broadens ERISA's preemptive effect: "Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State."5 8 The
scope of preemption was somewhat restricted, however, by the
"saving" clause: "[njothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking or securities."5 9
Nonetheless, by preempting all state laws "relating" to any employee benefit plan, and by forbidding an employee benefit plan
from being "deemed" an insurance or investment company for
state regulatory purposes, Congress created a broadly preemptive federal statutory scheme. The breadth of these provisions
was aimed at preventing "endless litigation over the validity of
State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well
as opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State
laws."60 Nevertheless, a series of cases construing the preemp56. See generally Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, at 365.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
58. Id. at § 1144(b) (2) (B).
59. Id. at § 1144(b) (2) (A). The effect of this language is unclear, but some
commentators think that the saving clause reflects the policy of the McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976), which left to the states the power to regulate the business of insurance. Comment, Regulation of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans: The Scope of ERISA's Preemption and The State Power to Regulate
Insurance, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV., 177, 183 (1979).
60. LEGISLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 4770-71 (remarks of Senator Javits). Senator Javits went on to say that "on balance, the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with
respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displace-
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tion provisions in the MET context has created precisely these
61
problems.
Various constitutional tests are used under the preemption
63
doctrine 62 to determine whether a state law is preempted.
Regardless of the test employed, however, a court always looks
for evidence of congressional intent in determining whether the
federal law preempts the field;64 other factors are considered
only if the federal statute is silent on preemption. 65 Because
ERISA expressly preempts state regulation affecting employee
benefit plans, 66 the language of the Act itself presents a very
strong case for broad preemption. Notwithstanding this express statutory provision, courts have shown a willingness to
permit state regulation in several welfare plan cases, some of
which involve METs.67
Courts commonly employ two approaches to permit state
regulation of METs. The first approach erodes the scope of ERISA's preemption section by finding that the plan in question is
not an ERISA employee benefit plan. Three cases are illustrament of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs." Id. at
4771. Congressman Dent noted "the crowning achievement of [ERISA in] the
reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans." 120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974).
61. See notes 67-110 infra and accompanying text.
62. The doctrine derives from the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTruTIONAL LAW 127-34 (9th ed. 1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 624 to 6-28, at 376-94 (1978); Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2, at 35.
63. The two most frequently employed tests are whether the state law conflicts or interferes with federal regulation and whether the federal law occupies
the field. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Hirsh, Toward a New
View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. Iii. L.F. 515; Turza & Halloway, supra note
19, at 372-75.
64. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 87-89
(1958).
65. Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, at 373.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d
692, 699 (7th Cir. 1977) (preemption does not apply because fund, a simple insurance plan, was not an ERISA plan); Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F.
Supp. 252, 256 (D.R.I. 1977) (ERISA does not preempt state banking commission's regulation of a bank's pension plan); Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n,
437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977) (preemption does not apply if employee benefit
plan can be characterized as simple insurance); Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust,
434 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D. Ariz. 1977) (ERISA does not preempt state regulation of employee benefit plans); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F.
Supp. 921, 926 (D. Minn. 1976) (ERISA does not preempt Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act). But cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 568 (1979) (ERISA's comprehensive regulation of pension
plans preempts federal and state securities laws).
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tive. In Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Association,68 a Kansas federal district court held that a MET was not an
"employee benefit plan" and thus was not covered by ERISA's
preemption provision. 69 The defendant, Employee Security
Benefit Association (ESBA), was a MET offering a "major medical" plan. 70 With the aid of insurance agents, ESBA marketed
the plan directly to employees, including self-employed persons, rather than selling it to companies desiring to provide
welfare plans for their workers. In determining that ERISA's
definition of an employee benefit plan 7 ' was not satisfied, the
Bell court found that ESBA was not an "employer"7 2 within
the meaning of the Act 73 and was not an "employee organization:"7 4 ESBA did not satisfy the participation requirement of
the definition 7 5 and there was no "commonality of interests
among its employee members." 76 The effect of the court's holding was to undercut the broad preemptive character of ERISA.
In a second case, Hamberlin v. V.LP. Insurance Trust,77 an
Arizona federal district court chose to focus on the entrepreneurial objectives of the MET defendant in finding ERISA inapplicable and the MET subject to state regulation. In
68. 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
69. Id. at 385-88. See also Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2, at 48; Turza &
Halloway, supra note 2, at 448-49.
70. 437 F. Supp. at 384.
71. Section 1002(3) provides: "The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan'
means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan
or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976). Thus, to qualify as an employee
benefit plan, ESBA would have to be an employee welfare benefit plan as defined in section 1002(1). See note 19 supra. In particular, to qualify as an employee welfare benefit plan ESBA would have to be "established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or both." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(1976).
72. Section 1002(5) provides: "The term 'employer' means any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of
employers acting for an employer in such capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1976).
73. 437 F. Supp. 382, 393 (D. Kan. 1977).
74. "Employee organization" is defined as
any labor union or any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee, association, group, or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning an employee benefit plan,
or other matters incidental to employment relationship; or any employees' beneficiary association organized for the purpose in whole or in
part, of establishing such a plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(4) (1976).
75. 437 F. Supp. at 394.
76. Id.
77. 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
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Hamberlin, it was claimed that the MET had been established
so as to circumvent state control. The court noted that the defendants had "caused the trust to be established under the belief that if the trust in form complied with [ERISA], it would be
exempt from control and supervision by the State."78 The court
found, however, that the ERISA definition of "employer" was
not satisfied because the trustees of the METs "were simply
not acting as agents of or on behalf of the employers or employer groups;" 7 9 thus, the MET was not an ERISA employee
benefit plan. Moreover, the court specifically refused to lend legitimacy to the formation of a MET for the sole purpose of circumventing state control.8 0
In a third MET case, Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus
Agency Service Corp.,81 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit borrowed principles from both Bell and Hamberlin to
hold that the MET was not an employee benefit plan for the
purposes of ERISA. Even if it were such a plan, the court
found that ERISA's preemption provisions did not apply to the
case at bar because the employer was unaware that it was participating in a plan.82 The court further reasoned that "Congress would have had no reason to exempt from state
regulation insurance programs that are established and maintained by entrepreneurs for their own profit." 83
A second preemption approach taken by courts is illustrated in Wadsworth v. Whaland84 and Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton.85 In both cases, the courts viewed the
substantive scope of preemption in narrow terms. In Wadsworth, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt regulation of group insurance policies
purchased by ERISA employee benefit plans. 86 New Hampshire had enacted a statute requiring issuers of group health insurance policies to provide coverage for the treatment of
78.

Id. at 1198.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 1199-1200.
81. 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 699. The circuit court modified a district court ruling in which the
judge found that ERISA's preemption provisions applied and that federal common law regulated the activities of the MET. See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 325 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
83. Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d at 699.
84. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978). See also
notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
85. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
86. 562 F.2d at 78.
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mental illness and emotional disorders.8 7 Administrators of
several welfare funds that purchased group insurance brought
a declaratory action seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute based upon ERISA's preemption provision. 88 The administrators claimed that the New Hampshire law regulated the
content of an employee welfare fund in conflict with ERISA.89
The Wadsworth court found that the employee welfare plan
was an insured entity, not a self-insurer, and thus not subject
to the state's law.90 The court noted that although the Federal
Act's "deemer" clause may preclude a state from designating
an employee benefit plan an insurance company for purposes
of state insurance regulation, the "saving" clause allows a state
to indirectly regulate an insured plan by regulating insurance
purchased by the plan.9 1 If a MET or welfare plan were operated as a self-funded trust, however, the Wadsworth court
92
would hold the state law preempted.
93
The court in Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton,
seemed to exceed the ambit of the Wadsworth case by denying
a preliminary injunction, but its recent companion case clearly
endorsed the Wadsworth approach. 94 The court in Insurers'Action Council refused to grant a preliminary injunction on the
ground that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a substantial
probability that the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act95 would be preempted by ERISA.96 The Minnesota
law requires employers to provide group insurance policies to
87. Id. at 72. For a discussion of this statute, see note 31 supra.
88. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d at 72-73.
89. Id. at 75-76.
90. Id. at 76. The court stated that only insurers were regulated by state
law. Id. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 1544-45. For a criticism of the
Wadsworth approach, see Comment, supra note 26, at 1536.
91. 562 F.2d at 78.
92. Id. at 76.
93. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
94. See St. Paul Electrical Workers Welfare Fund. v. Markman, 490 F.
Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980). Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp.
921 (D. Minn. 1976), was first heard before Judge Edward Devitt in December
1976. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against implementation of
the new Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act, MINN. STAT.
§§ 62E.01-62E.55 (1976). Judge Devitt, in denying the preliminary injunction,
discussed each of plaintiffs' five arguments: substantive due process, unconstitutional vagueness, equal protection, impairment of contract, and ERISA preemption. 423 F. Supp. at 923-27. By the time the case was heard on plaintiff's
motion for a permanent injunction in April 1980, it had been combined with a
companion case, St. PaulElectrical Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman. Judge
Devitt again denied plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction in Insurers'
Action Council, Inc. v. Marknan, 490 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1980).
95. MiNN. STAT. §§ 62E.01-62E.55 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
96. 423 F. Supp. at 926.
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their employees that meet specified criteria. The court construed ERISA's preemption provision narrowly, stating that
"the conflict between the challenged state insurance law and
ERISA has to be very clear in order to trigger the preemption
provision." 97 The court cited ERISA's "saving" clause, noted
that the substantive provisions of ERISA did not specify the
substance of the plans that employers are required to provide
their employees, and maintained that ERISA was not intended
to supersede the McCarran-Ferguson Act.98
Insurers' Action Council was later consolidated with St.
Paul Electrical Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman.99 The decision on the merits in Insurers'Action Council,100 which upheld
the constitutionality of the Minnesota Comprehensive Health
Insurance Act, was silent on the ERISA preemption issue.101
The St. Paul Electrical Workers decision, however, held that
the statute, as it applied to plaintiffs, was preempted by ERISA.102 The court reasoned that in attempting directly to regulate self-funded employee welfare benefit plans, the state act
violated ERISA's "deemer" clause.103 Following Wadsworth,
the court suggested in dictum that indirect state regulation of
insured plans through regulation of the issuers of insurance
would be allowable.104 The court, then, construed preemption
very narrowly in the earlier Insurers' Action Council case' 05
but later found a broader preemption standard consistent with
the Wadsworth approach in St. Paul Electrical Workers. In
both cases, however, the preemption line was at least as restrictively drawn as it was in Wadsworth, permitting indirect
state regulation of insured welfare plans through regulation of
the plans' insurers. 106
97. Id. It is possible that Judge Devitt was voicing a special standard for
preliminary injunctions against the enforcement of state insurance laws, but
there is no indication of this in the text of his opinion. Devitt's approach was
criticized in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504-05 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
98. Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. at 926.
99. 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980). See note 94 supra.
100. 490 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1980).
101. See note 94 supra.
102. 490 F. Supp. at 933-34.
103. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
104. No. 3-78-269, slip op. at - (D. Minn. May 21, 1980).
105. The approach was followed in at least two state court actions concerning pregnancy benefit statutes. See Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441, 451-52, 585
P.2d 12, 23 (1978); Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Ind., Labor, and Human Relations, No. 154-423 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Jan. 3, 1978). See generally Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2, at 56-58.
106. Each of the plaintiffs in St PaulElectrical Workers were self-insurers.
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Both the Bell and the Wadsworth approaches represent a
retreat from the broad preemption principles of ERISA.107 The
cases conflict with other decisions that have continued to uphold the preemption mandate of the Act.108 This confusing precedent is precisely what Congress sought to prevent.109 Both
Bell and Wadsworth, however, are attempts to address the regulatory void created by ERISA-a void pressuring courts to resolve problems left unanswered by the statute."10 Lacking a
practical alternative, courts are narrowing the preemption provision of ERISA to establish authority for state regulation.

B.

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES

Similar to the judicial responses to the problem, adminisNo. 3-78-269, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn. May 21, 1980). The plaintiffs in the Insurers'
Action Council suit were foreign insurance companies and an association of insurance carriers; no trust or employer plaintiffs were represented. 423 F. Supp.
at 923. A possible reading of the two cases is that the self-insured ERISA trusts
in St. PaulElectrical Workers were directly regulated by the Minnesota statute
and hence preempted by ERISA, whereas the regulation of insurance companies in Insurers'Action Council only indirectly affected ERISA trusts and following Wadsworth the state law was not preempted. Such a reading, however,
does not explain the earlier Heaton decision that seemed to focus not on the
characterization of the plaintiffs, but on the conflict between the state insurance law and ERISA. Nor is it possible to determine from the three decisions
what impact amendments to the Minnesota law had; several of the amendments increased the substantive and reporting obligations of self-insurers. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 62E.10(1), 62E.02(21), 62E.035 (Supp. 1979).
107. See notes 56-66 supra and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 568
(1979) (ERISA's comprehensive regulation of pension plans preempts federal
and state securities laws); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 697
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act preempted by ERISA); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (California
Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act preempted by ERISA); Azzaro v.
Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (New York administrators preempted from exercising supervisory jurisdiction over pension plans), affd without opinion, 553 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1977)
109. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
110. The Oregon Court of Appeals, when faced with this regulatory void in
ERISA stated:
[I]f we are to adopt the construction of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) advanced
...
we must import to Congress not only an intent to preempt state
law, but also an intent to cease all governmental regulation, state or
federal ....
There is nothing in the legislative history suggesting such
an intent. To the contrary, the legislative history indicates Congress
was concerned with the inadequacy of governmental regulation.
Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441, 454, 585 P.2d 12, 21 (1978).
For a general discussion of the judicially created exceptions to ERISA preemption, see Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2, at 23. "[Clourts have begun to
carve out exceptions.... There is a natural tendency to restrict the scope of
preemption where it appears to produce an inequitable result in a particular
case." Id. at 41.
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trative responses have narrowed ERISA's scope. In August
1979 the Department of Labor issued a statement encapsulating
the policies it had followed in earlier opinion letters on MET eligibility under ERISA.111 The policies were quite restrictive,
following a declaration by the House Committee on Education
and Labor that ERISA was not intended to regulate METs.112
The Committee, charged with oversight of ERISA, said in 1977
that
these plans are established and maintained by entrepreneurs for the
purpose of marketing insurance products or services to others. They
are not established or maintained by the appropriate parties to confer
ERISA jurisdiction, nor is the purpose for their establishment or mainappropriate to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the
tenance
1 13
Act.

The Department of Labor's policies on MET eligibility under
ERISA are in accordance with the Committee's views. The Department stated in August 1979 that
a MET arrangement is not a plan under ERISA if unrelated employers
have merely adopted identically worded agreements that are offered by
an independent third party as a means to fund plan benefits. In this
situation, each employer has its own plan and the organization which
provides benefits under contract with the employer is not itself an employee benefit plan but is instead the provider of a funding arrange1 14
ment for the various plans.

The Department of Labor position thus removes METs from
ERISA jurisdiction and makes the small employer in these
transactions the responsible party under ERISA. The employer's individual contract with the MET becomes the ERISA
plan upon which the employer-not the MET-is responsible
for ERISA compliance. The MET, as the provider of the services, is not subject to federal law; it is subject only to state law.
Based on the Department of Labor's statement, it appears
that a MET must satisfy two conditions to fall within ERISA's
jurisdiction: employer control of the plan and commonality of
interest among participants. 1 5 The tests were seemingly
111. News Release, supra note 15. Several opinion letters issued by the Department of Labor have applied the guidelines. See, e.g., Op. Letter 80-2A, Letter of Jan. 16, 1980, to Richard A. Block (regarding Michigan Ass'n of
Timbermen) PENS. REP. (BNA) at R-29; Op. Letter 79-54, Letter of Aug. 9, 1979,
to Richard B. Sanford (regarding Independent Businessmen's Association); Op.
Letter 70-49, Letter of July 19, 1979, to Richard E. Carllson (regarding Mutual
Assurance Trust).
112. AcTrvrry REPORT, supra note 13, at 48.
113. Id.
114. News Release, supra note 15.
115. See id. The two elements had appeared earlier in Bell v. Employee
Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 389, 394 (D. Kan. 1977). See notes 68-76
supra and accompanying text. It became clear the Department was frequently
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designed to exclude most METs from ERISA jurisdiction, although Labor Department determinations were to continue on
a case by case basis.116 At least one MET, Insurance Prepaid
Benefits Trust (IBT), attempted to restructure itself within
these new parameters. IBT created a board of employer trustees to control the trust and subdivided the organization into
separate industry or trade subtrusts with alleged "commonality
7
of interest among participants.""l
Both the House Committee's declaration1 8 and the Department of Labor's enunciated policies1 9 fail to provide meaningful criteria for differentiating between those METs that should
be subject to federal regulation under ERISA jurisdiction and
those that should be subject to state regulation under state law.
Two problems must be confronted. First, since the MET remains essentially unchanged when it is reorganized-the same
members subscribe and the same benefit packages are offered-a mere change in MET form can trigger a major change
in applicable law. Second, it is the large, easily manipulated
METs that can circumvent the guidelines to take advantage of
the federal law, yet it is these particular METs that states are
most concerned about and that federal authorities are most
anxious to turn over to aggressive state regulatory efforts. The
crucial problem, therefore, is how to regulate these METs effectively without forcing them out of the market and thereby losing the services they provide for small employers.
IV.

ERISA's OBJECTIVES

The House Committee's declaration that METs are not covered by ERISA can best be understood as a response to ERISA's current lack of substantive requirements for MET
regulation, rather than as a conclusion that the underlying
objectives of ERISA do not support federal regulation of METs.
using the requirements of employer control and commonality of interest in
opinion letters issued on METs. See note 111 supra. The August 1979 policies
again incorporated the two concepts of commonality and control, and it became
clear the standards were a fundamental part of the Labor Department's position. See Geisel, supra note 9, at 2 (referring to the standards as the "two key
tests" and attributing the statement to a Labor Department spokesperson). No
elaboration on the meanings of either of these terms was proffered by the Department of Labor, and litigation ensued. See note 117 infra and accompanying
text.
116. News Release, supra note 15.
117. David, supra note 42, at 48.
118. See note 13 supra.
119. See note 111 supra.
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A careful analysis of the MET transaction reveals that ERISA
was designed to cope with the types of problems generated by
METs and that ERISA is the best vehicle for MET regulation.
ERISA offers the potential for an expansive regulatory scheme
that reaches beyond present state efforts. Moreover, any attempt to exempt METs from ERISA regulation subjects other
ERISA welfare plans to conflicting regulations. An examination of the policies implicit in ERISA will help to illustrate how
ERISA could effectively handle the MET problem and fill the
regulatory void for welfare plans. ERISA has four major purposes: to combat the problem of illusory benefits, to place accountability for employee plans on the fiduciary, to avoid
overlapping regulations, and to incorporate a broader "plan as
process" notion into regulatory scope.
A.

ILLUSORY BENEFITS

One of the primary objectives of ERISA is to solve the
problem of "illusory benefits."120 The legislative hearings are
replete with examples of employees who relied upon the benefits provided by their employers, only to find that those benefits
were nonexistent.' 2 ' Often the examples were of pension
plans, the benefits of which were rendered illusory by an insolvent or unscrupulous employer. 2 2 Insolvent or unfair welfare
plans were another subject of concern.1 2 3 Removing the illusory aspect of employee benefits, therefore, appears to have
been one of Congress' foremost priorities. An employee's misplaced reliance upon benefits that do not exist can lead to more
serious problems than might have resulted if he or she knew
there would be no benefits. In the latter situation, an employee
knows that self-help will be necessary; in the former, even the
120. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 1605 (remarks of Senator
Williams).
121. See Brummond, supra note 11, at 59-61; Turza & Halloway, supra note
19, at 363-65.
122. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 1635 (remarks of Senator Bentsen); id. at 1665 (remarks of Senator Taft).
123. Several long term employees were "abruptly terminated" by a plant in
Dover, Ohio. The employees, ranging in tenure from 15 to 33 years, were all
over 50 years of age and lost both accumulated pension and welfare benefits.
Id. at 1666 (remarks of Senator Taft).
Another concern at the hearings was the rising cost of medical care for
workers reaching retirement years. "While it is common to stress that upon retirement, a couple's income needs shrink, they do not shrink as much as some
may believe. Medical costs go up and medicare meets only 40 percent of the
medical expenditures of the elderly." Id. at 1770 (Remarks of Senator Hartke).
See also id. at 1635 (Remarks of Senator Bentsen) (retired Minnesota worker
unable to pay for wife's shock treatments and his own cancer treatments).
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concerned employee is likely to be misled about the adequacy
124
of his or her coverage.
The problems encountered to date with METs are
problems of "illusory benefits": sudden bankruptcies, surprise
coverage exclusions, low coverage ceilings, and the like.125 On
its face, the illusory benefit problem would appear solvable by
either an aggressive state or federal regulatory program. As
will be discussed below, however, federal regulation is preferable.

B.

FIDUCIARIES

A second objective addressed by Congress in enacting ERISA is also applicable to METs: the need to enlarge the scope
and refine the responsibilities of plan fiduciaries. The ERISA
definition of a fiduciary is purposely very broad:
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect
to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
12 6
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.

The definition appears to be an attempt to return to broad common law notions of a fiduciary as "one who occupies a position
of confidence or trust."'127 It includes any employer, administrator, officer, trustee, or custodian of a plan, any member of an
investment or administrative committee of a plan, any officer or
director of a plan sponsor if control is exercised over the plan,
124. This is why, for example, the disclosure requirements were considered
essential in ERISA. See H.R. REP.No. 533, supra note 22, at 4639.

125.

See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.

126. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1976).
127. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 22, at 4649-51. As a result of this philosophy, ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciary exculpatory clauses, 29 U.S.C. § 1110
(1976), and imposes a uniform prudent investment standard. Id. at § 1104. For
the text of section 1104, see note 24 supra. In interpreting the prudent investor
rule and other fiduciary standards, courts are instructed by Congress to "[bear]
in mind the special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans intended to
be effectuated by the Act." H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 22, at 4650. Federal
courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction in all actions involving breach of
fiduciary responsibility, id. at § 1112(e) (1) (1976), and "[ilt is also intended that
a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans." LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, .supra note 28, at 4771 (reniarks of Senator Javits). Hence, amid strong concern for the increasingly interstate nature of employee benefit plans and the inability of traditional trust law to safeguard
employee rights, Congress passed a broad flexible statute designed to augment
a new judicially created substantive law of ERISA fiduciary responsibility.
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insurance salespersons who recommend the purchase of certain types of insurance, attorneys who counsel the employer,
the plan actuaries, and stock brokers or dealers who recommend securities for the plan.128 Should it so choose, the Labor
Department has authority to exempt certain categories of
29
fiduciaries and thereby refine the definition.1
ERISA subjects a fiduciary to liability for the breach of a
co-fiduciary, 3 0 to personal surcharge for any losses to the
plan,131 or to any other equitable or remedial relief including
removal. 132 Liability may arise from any act by the fiduciary
that is not for the exclusive purpose of "(i) providing benefits
to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."133 A further refinement is the allocation of responsibilities among
fiduciaries. 34 Thus, by first creating a broad fiduciary definition and then by limiting the statutory impact with administratively promulgated exemptions,135 the drafters of ERISA
created a flexible standard adaptable to varying situations.
Like the "illusory benefits" focus of ERISA, the fiduciary
emphasis of the statutory scheme addresses the kinds of
problems that surface in MET controversies. Application of
ERISA to METs would consequently seem appropriate. The
MET, in marketing to small employers, is playing a very spe128. See Little & Thrailkill, supra note 25, at 4-11. The Department of Labor
has indicated that even a labor arbitrator can be deemed a fiduciary within the
meaning of section 3(21) (A) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1976)), if the
arbitrator exercises discretionary authority regarding the management and administration of the plan. ERISA Op. Letter No. 79-66A, 5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH)
25,307 (Oct. 19, 1979). In such circumstances, however, the duties of
persons in other positions to the plan must be examined to determine whether
they involve the performance of these same functions. Id.
129. The Department of Labor has two tools with which to narrow the broad
scope of the fiduciary definition. First, by issuing an advisory opinion letter,
the department can advise a fiduciary whether he or she falls within ERISA or
whether the plan administered by the fiduciary falls within ERISA. See ERISA
Employee Benefit Plans Advisory Opinion Procedure § 5.01, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,281,
36,282 (1976). For an example of such an opinion letter, see note 53 supra. Second,. through its administrative variance procedure, the department can exempt
certain transactions performed by the fiduciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1976).
For a critique of the variance procedure, see Note, At Variance with the AdministrativeExemption Proceduresof ERISA; A ProposedReform, 87 YALE LJ. 760
(1978).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976).
132. Id.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A) (1976).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 22, at 4561, 4564.
135. See note 129 supra.
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cialized role. 136 Health and life insurance137 are notoriously
complex and often generates consumer protection legislation to
prevent exploitation of ignorant buyers.138 To determine if an
ERISA fiduciary should be held accountable for a poorly
designed welfare benefits package, it is important to consider
the relative expertise of the buyer and the seller.13 9 In a typical
multiple employer trust situation, the small employer (buyer)
is likely to be unfamiliar with welfare plans or ERISA140 and
the employee (beneficiary) is likewise inexpert. The MET
(seller), however, is an insurance expert and can therefore capitalize on this expertise. The relative expertise of these parties
dictates holding the small employer141 to a prudent person
136. See note 4 supra.
137. These are the most common categories of welfare benefits, see 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976), but a welfare plan may also include fringe benefits such
as holiday and vacation pay. See generally Electrical Workers Local 1 Credit
Union v. I.B.E.W.-N.E.C.A. Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (1979).
138. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. §§ 72C.01-72C.13 (1978) (Readability of Insurance
Policies Act, enacted "to provide that insurance policies and contracts be readable and understandable to a person of average intelligence, experience, and
education"); MINN. STAT. §§ 60B.01-60B.61 (1978), (Insurers Rehabilitation and
Liquidation Act, enacted for the "protection of the interests of insureds, creditors, and the public generally"); N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 154, 155, 168 (McKinney 1966 &
Supp. 1980) (prescribing insurance forms, endorsements by administrative officials).
The common law of many states has always protected consumers from insurance companies and their representatives. For example, where the terms of
an insurance contract are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain, the terms are to
be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.
See generally Great Lakes Transit Corp. v. Interstate S.S. Co., 301 U.S. 646
(1937); Trans-Continental Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 262 Ala. 373, 78 So.2d 917
(1955), Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801
(1956); Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953).
Under the law of New York, "[a]n insurance policy 'should be so plain and unambiguous that men of average intelligence who invest in these contracts may
know and understand their meaning and import."' Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Pound Ridge, 362 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting Hartol Prods.
Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 44, 50, 47 N.E. 2d 687, 690 (1943)). See also
Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HAV. L.
REv. 961 (1970).
139. For example, one should consider whether the failure of the fiduciary
to secure a financially sound insurance underwriter or to provide a sufficiently
complete welfare plan should cause the fiduciary to be liable. See Wayne
Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977) (failure of fiduciary to secure a convertability clause led to plaintiff's loss of insurability).
140. This lack of expertise among small employers may in part be the cause
of numerous small plan terminations since ERISA's enactment. See Lurie, Lanoff, & Stuchinor, supra note 4, at 174 ("small plans also account for 98 percent
of all the terminations that have been reported to us since ERISA").
141. An employer, whether in a small or large business, falls within the
broad definition of fiduciary under ERISA. the employer has "discretionary au-
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standard 42 and the MET 143 to a prudent expert standard. 144
The employer, when purchasing a benefits package from a
MET, does not create the terms of the plan but rather accepts
the terms offered by the MET.145 The MET serves as a consultant or adviser to the employer, and the only discretionary decision made by the employer in the transaction is how much
money will be spent on the employee benefit plan. Thus, the
MET in a MET-employer transaction functions as a fiduciary
within the meaning of the ERISA definition: it exercises discretionary authority as a result of special expertise. 4 6 In addition, the MET-employer transaction is a classic example of the
allocation of responsibilities among co-fiduciaries. It therefore
follows that fiduciary liability should be placed on both the
MET and the employer because each exercises discretion over
the plan. 147
thority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [a] plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1976).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (13) (1976) sets out a prudent person standard,
requiring "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of a prudent person "in a
like capacity and familiar with.., an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims." Thus, the definition suggests a "sliding scale" notion of responsibility. While there is very little comment on this standard in the legislative history of ERISA, considerable discussion of a federal prudent person rule
occurred in Congressional hearings held in 1970. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislatiorn Hearings on H.R. 16462 Before the Gen'l Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.,
521 (1969-70). The standard then under discussion was essentially the same as
the subsequently enacted ERISA standard. See Little & Thrailkill, supra note
25, at 12-13; Note, supra note 29, at 968. Testifying at 1970 hearings, then Secretary of Labor Schultz stressed that the rule was intended to contain a built-in
flexibility so that equitable standards would be applied both to small trusts and
to financial institutions. Id. at 521.
143. The MET, as well as the employer, would appear to fall within the
broad definition of fiduciary under ERISA because the MET exercises discretionary authority over many features of the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A)
(1976). See also Little & Thrailkill, supra note 25, at 4.
144. Many feel that the prudent expert standard is the standard intended
by the "like capacity" and "familiarity" terms of 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976) for
those in a professional fiduciary position. See Little & Thrailkill, supra note 25,
at 12.
145. For example, in Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp.,
567.F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977), the employer was not informed of a change in benefits or of a change in underwriters. The court held that the employer was not
liable for the coverage omission. Id. at 695. See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21) (A) (1976); notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
147. David Brummond, Counsel for the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, takes the opposite point of view. In an amicus curiae brief
filed in the Wayne Chemical case, Brumrnond argued that state laws which traditionally regulate the business of insurance are a more appropriate forum for
policing METs. Amicus Curiae Brief at 24-25, Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus
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In light of the above evaluation, the Department of Labor's
1979 statement1 48 and the House Committee's 1977 declaration
of policy149 seem especially ill-advised. The Labor Department
and the House Committee would remove fiduciary responsibility from the MET150 and shift it to the small employer.151 Instead of looking to the MET as fiduciary expert, the
Department of Labor152 focuses on the fiduciary nonexpertthe small employer, who in many cases has hired the MET's
ERISA specialist services to deal with the mounting administrative burdens imposed by ERISA. 15 3 Thus, the fiduciary responsibility of the MET remains unregulated despite the
MET's central role in creating a particular welfare plan. The
failure to extend ERISA coverage to METs contradicts both the
"illusory benefits" concern of Congress and the "fiduciary" emphasis of the statute.
C.

OVERLAPPING REGULATION

Congress designed ERISA's broad preemption provision to
Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). Since state insurance laws are
designed to intervene where there is a disparity of bargaining power, he argued, they should be permitted to operate in this circumstance "to protect 'the
weaker contracting party'-participating employers and employees-from the
'stronger' contracting parties-entrepeneurs like CASCO and NMEF [the
METs]." Id. at 25. Brummond's analysis, however, fails to address the actual
effect of ERISA on this three-party transaction. Even if state laws can police
METs as insurers, the employer-the weaker contracting party--remains responsible for ERISA compliance. If the MET provides only illusory benefits,
the employer is held responsible even though the employer is often in a weaker
contracting position than the MET. Thus, the federal scheme of regulation appears preferable because it permits an allocation of responsibility among the
three parties to the transaction consonant with their actual bargaining
strength.
148. See notes 111-119 supra and accompanying text.
149. See note 13 supra.
150. While some states can be expected to respond by beginning aggressive
MET regulation, the majority of states have not attempted to regulate fiduciary
responsibility of METs. See note 9 s-upra. State regulation to date has involved
the "business of insurance." See notes 30 & 56 supra. Furtherniore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act appears to limit state regulatory power to these "business of
insurance" areas. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 38, at 5.
151. The Labor Department clearly intends to shift focus from the MET to
the employer.
[A] MET arrangement is not a plan under ERISA if unrelated employers have merely adopted identically worded agreements that are offered by an independent third party as a means to fund plan benefits.
In this situation, each employer has its own plan, and the [MET] ... is
instead the provider of a funding arrangement for the various plans.
News Release, supra note 15.
152. See note 111 supra.
153. See Lurie, Lanoff, & Stuchinor, supra note 4, at 178 (burdens of designing and operating a plan increased by ERISA).
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preclude conflicting state regulatory efforts; 5 4 the "relate to"'5 5
5 7
and "deemer" 5 6 clauses evidence this expansive purpose.I
The trend toward interpreting ERISA's preemption section narrowly in MET cases,1 5 8 however, is contrary to ERISA's preemption policies for several reasons. First, conflicting state
approaches to welfare plan regulation can cause serious administrative problems for multistate plans. 5 9 Multistate plans
must meet both federal and state requirements rather than a
uniform federal standard as envisioned by ERISA. Second, the
self-interested actions of one state can harm another state. For
example, when Illinois, trying to save its own state insurance
business, forced Old Republic to shut down its out of state
trust accounts, the termination of services had an adverse
financial effect on several METs in other states.160 Such ramifications appear inherent in a multiple-state regulatory effort.
Third, state by state regulatory efforts fail to address fiduciary
responsibilities in welfare plan transactions. Although state
laws regulate the insurance aspects of METs,161 they do not
62
regulate METs as specialized fiduciaries to small employers.
Thus, ERISA's fiduciary emphasis, which is necessary if the
misinformation and illusory benefits problems are to be
avoided,163 is lost when regulation is relinquished to the states.

D.

PLAN AS "PROCESS"

The broad definition of the term "plan" in ERISA presents
a final reason why METs are best left within the ambit of federal regulation. Several of the preemption decisions have limited the definition,164 but given the overall. function of the plan
as a broadly regulated process within the ERISA framework,
154.
155.
156.
text.
157.

See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (1976). See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 144(b) (2) (B) (1976). See note 58 supra and accompanying
LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 4770-71 (remarks of Senator Ja-

vits).
158. See notes 54-110 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 32 supra.
160. See Trust Losses, supra note 5, at 31.
161. See Brummond, supra note 11, at 66; Hellner, The Scope of Insurance
Regulation: What is Insurancefor Purposes of Regulation?,12 AM. J. Comp. L
494, 495 (1963); Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation, A Preliminary

Inquiry into the Theory of InsuranceLaw, 45 MhN. L.REv. 471, 475 (1961).
162. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 126-38 supra and accompanying text.
164. See generally Wayne Chem., Inc., v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567
F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382
(D. Kan. 1977); Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
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such a narrowing is unwise. The better approach is to continue
a flexible notion of "plan" so that it includes MET transactions
as well as other ERISA transactions.
ERISA treats employee benefit plans much more like
processes than products; the statute subjects a large range of
activities associated with the plans to federal regulation. Use of
multiple adjectival phrases in the statute demonstrates that a
plan is more a process than a tangible thing. Thus when written, separate parts of a plan are termed plan documents. 165 An
insurance policy can be part of a plan, but it is not the plan it166
self; the plan documents include the insurance contract.
When the plan is described, it becomes a "summary plan
description."'1 67 All assets of a plan are held in a trust; the
trustees are named either in the trust instrument or the plan
instrument. 168 The trust is not the plan; rather it is a component of the plan.16 9 Requisite features of a plan include procedures for funding, allocation of responsibilities, plan
amendments, and payment specifications.170 Hence, one can
conclude that a distinguishing feature of an ERISA "plan" is
temporal change. Each change is subject to ERISA regulation.
Unlike a trust, which has a very discrete time of creation after
which all documents, assets, and terms are fixed, 17 1 an ERISA
plan can be any "plan, fund, or program"'172 and can become
more particularized in its features over time. A plan might
73
even be created by an employer before any of its terms exist.1
"Plan" is really a label for a broad matrix of events.
This process notion of an ERISA plan permits the imposition of fiduciary duties during the early phases of a plan when
165. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 616.
166. Id. ("[i]n the case of insured plans, this would encompass the insurance contract or similar agreement").
167. 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976).
168. Id. at § 1103.
169. Id. at § 1144(b) (2) (B).
170. Id. at § 1102(b).
171. The essential elements of a trust are a designated beneficiary and
trustee, a fund sufficiently identified to enable title to pass to the trustee, and
actual delivery to the trustee with the intention of passing title. City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co. v. Charity Organization Soc'y, 238 A.D. 720, 722, 265 N.Y.S.
267, 270 (1933).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
173. ERISA permits different "lag" times for various portions of the Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1086 (1976). Initial reporting of a plan description does not occur until four months after creation. Id. at 1024(a) (1). Most periodic reports
only occur annually, id. at § 1023, and certain exemptions or alternative means
of compliance are also possible. Id. at § 1030. See also Regulations Relating to
Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.104-2 to 46 (1979).
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particular details are being formulated. Although an employer
may create a plan, responsibility to devise particular terms and
benefits is assigned to the MET and these duties can be viewed
as distinct from the creation of the plan itself. The MET should
therefore be held responsible as a fiduciary to "discharge [its]
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." 174 As a fiduciary, the MET could be
held liable for breach of its duty if it designed a patently inadequate benefits schedule.175 Hence, the process notion of an ERISA plan supports an extension of ERISA fiduciary
responsibilities to METs.
Recent efforts to exclude METs from ERISA jurisdiction
are contrary to the illusory benefits and special fiduciary concerns of the statute. Moreover, such efforts frustrate the statute's preemption policies and treatment of the "plan" as a
broad, decisional matrix or process. Only federal regulation of
METs under ERISA will provide adequate and uniform controls.
V. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
It is beyond the scope of this Note to propose specific statutory amendments to ERISA. Three general changes, however,
are suggested. First, ERISA's definition of a fiduciary should
be amended clearly to include METs.176 This would be consistent with the original purposes of the Act-to place responsibility on the person or agency most central to the plan's
administrationl 77 and most able to remedy the problem of illusory benefits.178 Second, minimum benefits requirements for
welfare plans should be enacted to fill the present void in the
Act, a void that has placed severe strain on the broad preemption policies of ERISA179 and has unduly limited the definition
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (1976).
175. For example, in Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp.,
567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977), the MET failed to continue the plan's conversion
privileges when switching underwriters. The omission led to a denial of benefits for plaintiffs disabled son. Id. at 693-96.
176. Even though this Note has advanced the theory that one can interpret
the ERISA definition of "fiduciary" to include METs, see notes 126-35 supra and
accompanying text, judicial attempts to narrow the statute's preemption and
definition sections have led to a different result. See notes 68-109 supra.
177. See notes 126-35 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 120-24 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. See also Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 2, where the authors stated that "there is a natural tendency
to restrict the scope of preemption where it appears to produce an inequitable
result in a particular case." Id. at 42. The authors concluded that "although al-
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of "plan" in the Act.180 Adopting such requirements admittedly
would be a difficult task but a study commission could be appointed to draft a schedule of requirements.181 Several private
and public agencies have already proposed model comprehensive health insurance packages designed to provide acceptable
coverage,1 82 and a number of states have initiated minimum requirements. 183 Given these past efforts to specify requirements, it should be possible to write a satisfactory proposal for
ERISA purposes. Finally, the present reporting and disclosure
requirements of ERISA184 should be augmented to complement
the new minimum benefits requirements. By requiring the
plan administrator to inform each member employee of those
benefits that are provided by the plan and those that are not,
the illusory benefits problem could be partially alleviated.l85
Plan administrators could be required to set out the specific
benefit package offered and recommend supplementary coverage to be purchased separately by the employee. This is a dimension of accountability not currently incorporated in the
Act's reporting and disclosure requirements. 86
lowing state regulations of funding, vesting, and benefit provisions of these
plans may appear to further the cause of employee protection, it would create
immense difficulties for multistate plans." Id. at 57.
180. See notes 164-75 supra and accompanying text.
181. In a similar approach, Congress has directed that a task force be
formed to study and make a report on "the effects and desirability of the Federal preemption of State and local law with respect to matters relating to pension and similar plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(5) (1976).
182. The Accident and Health Subcommittee of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), for example, has recently drafted a model
comprehensive health insurance benefits package. See Brummond, supranote
11, at 84. The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) has also proposed a minimum benefits standard. National Health Insurance Proposals: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, Pt.
I, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 101-02 (Oct. 19 & 20, 1971).
183. See, e.g., Minnesota Comprehensive Health Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 62E.0162E.55 (1978 & Supp. 1979); Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAwAI REV. STAT.
§§ 393-1 to 393-5 (1976 & Supp. 1979); California Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 1340-1399 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1980).
184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976).
185. The concern that employees would not.be on notice of the strengths
and weaknesses of their plan benefits was expressed by the House Education
and Labor Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 22, at 4646.
186. Current reporting and disclosure requirements are limited to a description of plan contents, 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976), a statement of the participants' accrued benefits, id. at § 1025, and a general statement of the employee's ERISA
rights--called an ERISA Notice. See 29 C.FR § 2520.104b-5 (1979). No obligation is placed on the fiduciary to inform the employee of benefits he does not
have but would be well-advised to purchase.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

ERISA was adopted to prevent illusory employee benefits
through aggressive reporting, disclosure, delineation of fiduciary responsibilities, civil enforcement, and other requirements.
Nevertheless, the lack of substantive requirements for welfare
plans has led the Department of Labor, the House Legislative
Oversight Committee, and some courts to narrow ERISA's preemption, definitional, and fiduciary sections to exclude multiple
employer trusts from ERISA jurisdiction. 8 7 Foreclosure of the
Act's liberal coverage and preemption provisions is unwise,
however, and administrative and judicial decisions that narrowly define ERISA's provisions are adversely affecting other
multistate welfare plans whose status is uncertain under ERISA.188 A careful analysis of the MET transaction reveals that
it is characterized by a number of serious problems that ERISA
was designed to correct. A MET is a specialized fiduciary that
reaches beyond state borders and is capable of avoiding regulation. These organizations often mislead unsuspecting employees and employers into purchasing illusory benefits packages.
METs should be federally regulated under an amended ERISA
with broad fiduciary regulations, new mandatory minimum
benefits schedules, and more salient reporting and disclosure
requirements. Failure to enact these types of statutory
changes will result in inadequate protection for MET beneficiaries and further confusion in the developing body of ERISA
law.

187. ERISA's preemption section recently escaped a further narrowing
when a preemption rider was withdrawn in the final stages of congressional action on the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act. See note 3 supra.
Hawaii attempted to secure an exemption for its Health Care System from the
scope of ERISA preemption. Such an exemption would have permitted Hawaii
to regulate the minimum benefit requirements of all ERISA plans in the state,

including METs. The Senate, however, withdrew the proposal from its final
bill. See HR REP. No. 1343, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5924, 5925.
188. See note 32 supra.

